I need to solve a varient of the stag hunt game for my class in Game Theory. Consider only m hunters, with 2 </=m<n needed to catch the stag. Assume captured stag is shared only by hunters who catch it. Under each of the following, find the Nash equilibiria of the strategic game that models the situation.
a.) Each hunter prefers the fraction 1/n of the stag to hare
b.) Each hunter prefers 1/k of the stag to a hare but prefers a hare to any smaller fraction of the stag, where k is an integer with M</=k</=n
I'm stuck setting the game up. Does anyone have suggestions?
a.) Each hunter prefers the fraction 1/n of the stag to hare
b.) Each hunter prefers 1/k of the stag to a hare but prefers a hare to any smaller fraction of the stag, where k is an integer with M</=k</=n
I'm stuck setting the game up. Does anyone have suggestions?